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ABSTRACT
Tzul, Sheril Sherine; M.S.; Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics; College
of Agriculture, Food Systems, and Natural Resources; North Dakota State University;
December 2007.  A Game Theory Analysis of Firm Reaction to External Organizational
Demands: The Case of Animal Welfare Standards.  Major Professor: Dr. Cheryl
Wachenheim.
There has been increasing public concern about farm animal welfare regarding
transportation, slaughter, and some management practices, especially in systems where
animals are confined for most of their existence.  Animal welfare organizations (groups)
have traditionally focused on forwarding their agendas through legislation, although more
recent attempts have focused on convincing large firms that buy agricultural commodities
to require particular production process standards to be met.
The strategic interactions of players in the egg industry are modeled using a game
theory approach.  Two scenarios were explored: a principal-agent contract model between
food firms and farmers, and a model where two firms are targeted by animal activists.  The
former model was empirically analyzed while the latter model was theoretically examined.
Results for the principal-agent contract model indicate that, in general, the decision
by the farmer of whether to invest in a free-range production system is dependent on the
probability of being caught cheating. Whether contracts will be accepted or rej ected by
suppliers is dependent on the premium for free-range eggs.  Finally, as the amount that can
be lost if caught breaching the contract decreases, investment is motivated only with a
higher probability of being caught.
Theoretical analysis where competition did not matter and animal welfare was not a
determinant of demand shows that animal activists must convince food firms that there will
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be a significant change in revenue with compliance as opposed to rejecting the contract or
negotiating a compromise in order to attain their objectives of increased animal welfare.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
Background
As industries move through their growth cycle, there are many challenges that
cannot be escaped.  Obstacles encountered fall under various categories, including
management; human resources; policies; and, perhaps one of the most important,
productivity.  Animal agriculture is no different from other industries; it has, is still, and
will be undergoing many changes governing its existence.  These may include changing
demand from consumers due to increasing health awareness and income levels, changing
preferences, availability of inputs and other resources, and, of course, technology advances
that increase productivity.  Changing consumer preferences include those for food product
and process attributes including food quality, food safety, envirorment, social
conditions/ethics, and animal welfare (Fulponi, 2005).
Productivity in animal agriculture has increased dramatically since World War 11
with the use of animal confinement, genetic selection, scientific feed formulation, and
productivity-enhancing phamaceuticals (Farm Foundation, 2006).  Modifications that
occur in industries are mostly driven by efforts to lower costs while maintaining quality
that is capable of generating a profit.  Farm Foundation father notes that, in animal
agriculture, there has been a shift to larger production units in order to take advantage of
economies of scale.  Critics contend that these changes have reduced the welfare or well-
being of farm animals.  At the same time, Curtis (2007) argues that animal productivity or
animal performance is still the most reliable indicator of an animal's well-being.
What does animal welfare mean? Animal welfare is a human responsibility that
encompasses all aspects of animal well-being, including proper housing; management;
nutrition; disease prevention and treatment; responsible care; humane handling; and, when
necessary, humane euthanasia (AVMA, 2007). 1  Albright (2005) mentions that a more
recent and widely used definition of animal welfare is where the animal is in a state of
complete mental and physical health and hence in harmony with its environment.  Animal
welfare is a Potemkin attribute, meaning a process oriented quality hidden for third parties
as well as customers at the end product level (Jahn, Schramm, and Spiller, 2004). The
European Union (EU) has termed the ideal states of animal welfare as the "five freedoms".
This includes that animals should be free from: hunger and thirst; discomfort; pain, injury
and disease; and fear and distress, and have the freedom to express normal behavior
(European Communities, 2007).
Henry Bergh founded the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals (ASPCA) in New York City in the 1860s. His motivation came fi-om being
disturbed by the cruel treatments to animals he saw in Russia and other parts of Europe
while he was serving his tern there as a diplomat.  He began his work consulting the Earl
of Harrowby in London, president of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals.  He created a Declaration of the Rights of Animals and persuaded many
influential people to sign it in 1866 and, a few days later, the legislature passed anticruelty
legislation.  The ASPCA was to enforce it.  The organization now is a nationally influential
organization that engages in the direct protection of animals through its shelters and
adoption facilities (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2006; Shea, n.d.).
According to animal activists, current farm practices significantly decrease the well
being of animals which are raised commercially and slaughtered to produce the many
I"The term euthanasia is derived from the Greek word e# meaning good and /fecz#czfos death. A "good death"
would be one that occurs with minimal pain and distress" (AVMA, 2007, p.  1).
products with specific attributes that Americans are demanding including poultry, pork,
eggs, milk, and beef.  Hillman and Huffiian (2001) claim that abuses of farm animals are
spread quite evenly throughout the meat, dairy and egg industries with the difference being
how the abuse is inflicted.  For example, pigs are confined in gestation crates, laying hens
in cages, and veal calves chained by the neck in a crate built small enough to allow
minimum movement.
Furthermore, animal activists also claim that, among the almost 300 million laying
hens raised in the U.S. for eggs, more than 95 percent are intensively confined in small
wire `battery cages," stacked several tiers high and extending down long warehouses.
Among the many practices in modem farming that animal activists claim compromise the
welfare of laying hens are beak trimming, forced molting, and lack of dust-bathing and
perching opportunities.  For hogs and veal calves the criticism is more focused on the
restriction of space to perform normal behaviors as well as transporting and management
practices (HSUS, 2006).  Animal activists' are therefore advocating for less restrictive
environments for farm animals.  Some groups argue that they are seeking to promote
socially responsible production systems in agriculture.  People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals (PETA) says it has chosen to shed light on the chicken industry in recent years
because large chicken producers and sellers have made little movement toward more
humane practices (Wamer, 2005). Another reason why confinement is a focus issue is due
to the claim from advocates that there is strong scientific evidence that welfare is decreased
when animals are confined because there is serious harm done to animals' physical and
mental health (Sluizer, 2006).
Animal activists are pressuring food service organizations to compel suppliers to
meet new welfare requirements. Restaurants are activists' focus for two major reasons.
First, they are at an interface of supply chains with consumers.  Second, groups know that
food services are seeking to secure market position and advantage through stimulating and
satisfying growing consumer demands for appropriate `quality assurance' (Baines, 2002).
Animal activists are strong in their pursuit to have industries phase out confinement
practices and implement fi.ee-range production for laying hens and group housing for sows
instead of gestation crates.  But what exactly constitutes free-range?  Free-range involves
hens being loose-housed and having daily access to the outdoors.  The range of associated
housing is wide, but may be similar to that used for ban production (Botheras, Hemsworth,
Coleman, and Bamett, 2006).  Producers labeling poultry as free-range must demonstrate
to the USDA that the poultry has been allowed outdoor access.  USDA regulates the label
for poultry but not for eggs. No specific amount of time for outside access is required. This
label does not require third-party certification (Oberholtzer, Greene, Lopez, 2006).  Singer
and Mason (2006) explain the way fraud can occur with these labels, "at times these
producers will have surplus caged eggs they can't sell," and "Where do you think those
eggs are going to be going? In cage-free cartons" (pp.109-110).   Overall animal advocates'
quest is for farm animals to have opportunities to be at ease with their envirorment,
meaning no normal behavior is compromised.
Problem Statement
The issue of farm animal welfare is increasing in visibility.  During the last few
decades there has been increasing public concern about the ways in which food animals are
raised, transported, and slaughtered (Mench, 2002; Seng and Laporte, 2005 ; and Mitchell,
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2001).   Concerns are expressed about the conditions in which farm animals are kept and
some management practices, particularly in systems where animals are kept in confinement
for most of their lives Q7arm Foundation, 2006).
The number of interest groups engaging in political lobbying has increased
dramatically since 1970.  It is estimated that the number of interest groups doubled in the
United States from 1955 to 1970; doubled again from 1970 to 1990 and reached 20,000
identified interest groups in 1995.  This includes groups of all types.  Among the many
social activist groups, one of them that has an excellent template for success is PETA
(Whiting, 2005). Other animal welfare groups include Farm Sanctuary, Humane Society of
the United States (HSUS) and ASPCA.
Animal welfare organizations (groups) have traditionally focused on forwarding
their agendas through legislation, although more recent attempts have focused on
convincing large firms who buy agricultural commodities to require particular production
process standards to be met.  Most notable is their success in influencing adoption of
standards for cage sizes of laying hens by focusing their efforts on a key buyer
(MCDonald's Corporation), and recent legislative and `behind the scenes' 1obbying (of
firms) regarding gestation and farrowing crates in production facilities in the hog industry.
In 2000, animal rights organizations began to demand that individual restaurant chain
companies force their suppliers to follow specific animal welfare guidelines (Brown and
Hollingsworth, 2005).
Animal activists have also been able to persuade several chain restaurant companies
to begin developing their own guidelines and programs in an effort to demonstrate to
customers their concern for animal welfare (Brown and Hollingsworth, 2005).  For
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example, PETA and Burger King have been meeting periodically. Burger King
Coxporation has announced a goal of two percent of its eggs to be "cage-free" and ten
percent of its pork to come from fams that allow sows to move around inside pens, rather
than be confined to crates.  It expects to more than double the two percent of cage-free eggs
by the end of 2007 (Martin, 2007; Pork Magazine, 2007).  Additionally, Rosenthal (2007)
reports that Smithfield Inc., the nation's largest pork producer with 1.2 million breeding
sows, has agreed to phase out gestation crates over the next decade. Florida and Arizona
voted to ban gestation crates in 2002 and 2006, respectively.  Additionally, Pork Magazine
(2007) states that CKE restaurants, the California-based parent company of Hardees and
Carl's Jr., announced that 15 percent of the pork it uses will come from producers that do
not use gestation crates and that, although the time line is not yet clear, they expect this
percentage to increase to 25 by 2009.  CKE is responding to pressure from PETA.
Sohail, Bryant, and Roland (2004) and Blandford (2006) report an important
success story.  In 2002 the United Egg Producers announced a new certification program
that requires a significant increase in space per hen to produce eggs to improve animal
welfare.
Lefebvre (2006) reports on a growing animal welfare campaign that has a wave of
colleges and universities, coaporate cafeterias, natural food markets, and management
companies either eliminating or reducing the use of eggs from confined hens.  The
Washington D.C. based HSUS has been at the forefront over the last year to aggressively
promote cage-free egg use.
It is clear from the many advances that aninial advocates are seeing the fiuits of
their labor and are continuing to work hard in an effort to fulfill their agenda; better
husbandry practices for farm animals that will improve their welfare. There has been a
marked increase in the number of animal welfare bills introduced in the U.S. Congress in
recent years (Blandford, 2006)t  Given the recent successes of animal rights groups at the
voting booth, future successes seem likely (Lusk, Norwood, Prickett, 2007).
Whether to require meat inputs and other livestock products purchased from
suppliers to result from particular production practices is a strategic choice for firms. There
are multiple consequences associated with imposing requirements, potentially including
reaction of customers, suppliers, and competitors, the impact on profitability, and future
demands for changing process standards.  The major challenge here for food firms is that
changing procurement practices can have a significant effect on their sales, market share,
and reputation.
As with any pressure to make changes to already existing practices, industry players
must critically analyze what is in it for them especially in terms of sustainability and of
course profitability.  Before any long term decisions can be made, firms must be convinced
that they can: demand a premium for welfare-friendly products or more generally that
revenue change will be positive (e.g., also due to increased sales) and that increases in
production costs are reasonable.  Unless firms note strong economic incentive, animal
activists will have a greater challenge.
Objectives
This project evaluates strategic decisions and defines optimal choices that a firm, its
competitors and its suppliers will pursue given proposals by animal welfare groups
regarding livestock production practices. The focus will be on estimating how progress on
standards in animal welfare might influence the procurement demands of food industry
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firms.  It aims to identify firm choices and to evaluate the role of competitors and their
decisions, including estimating payoffs associated with decisions made by firms and the
reaction generated from competitors and from animal welfare organizations.
This study identifies a "process standard" of current interest being promoted by
animal welfare groups, focusing on housing altematives for laying hens. Specific
objectives are to : evaluate the impact of choice sets (choices) on firm profitability, identify
optimal choices for industry participants, and test the sensitivity of choices to key variables
using game theory.
Organization
This study is composed of five different chapters.  Chapter I was an introduction to
the scope of the study, and included a brief history of animal welfare and its increasing
importance. The following chapter focuses on reviewing relevant literature on studies that
have been conducted as well as infomation about the targeted industry that will assist
readers in understanding the food firm and animal activists' issues.  Chapter Ill deals with
data collection and its analysis and presents the model used to arrive at the results.  The
subsequent chapter explains the empirical and theoretical results obtained from the two
games analyzed.  Finally Chapter V concludes the thesis discussion with a summary of the
scope of study, results, implications as well as potential areas for further exploration.
CHAPTER 11. LITHRATURE REVIEW
Market Structure
New industry structures are emerging in the U.S. under vertical integration or other
extension of food industry firms' activities within the supply chain.  This trend has become
more popular as firms attempt to respond to changes in consumer demand, technology
advances, the importance of plant capacity utilization, issues associated with securing
inputs, and pressures from various interest groups. Nearly all commercial poultry
production in the United States is company-managed, a system known as vertical
integration (Leer, 2005).  Companies are discovering that vertical integration, which is the
process by which entities control many links in the supply chain of a product or service,
allows for physical and transaction economies (Postrell, 2003).
The value of all agricultural production under contract has risen dramatically in
recent years, roughly tripling over the last three decades (MacDonald et al., 2004).  James,
Klein, and Svkuta (2007) state that the increase in contract farming and vertically
integrated forms of production are undoubtedly two of the most important changes in late
twentieth-century U. S. agriculture.  Contracts now govern about half of livestock
production. And, while vertical integration is common in livestock commodities, it is
particularly pronounced in the egg industry.
Our focus will be diverted to the egg industry in an effort to accomplish two
objectives. The first is to aid in understanding the relationship between the members of the
supply chain.  The second is to provide background necessary to evaluate the economic
implications that will emerge as a result of strategic actions undertaken by the members of
the supply chain as they respond to the many pressures exerted from all angles2 especially
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those fi-om animal welfare groups.  This approach will aid in accomplishing the larger
objective of defining optimal choices for the players involved including food firms, their
competitors and their suppliers given various proposals by interest groups.
Egg Industry
The egg industry engages in raising hens for egg production either to be sold for
human consumption or for hatching chicks. Prior to the 1940' s most poultry production in
the U.S. consisted of hens kept by families for the production of eggs for their own
consumption or for sale locally (Mench, 2002). h the early 1950's through the 1960's,
small extensive farms were transformed into large intensive production units (USDA
American Egg Board, 2007). Today, the industry is highly vertically integrated; large egg
producers deal directly with breeders to obtain parent stocks and then produce their own
hatching eggs, chicks, and pullets (Hayenga et al., 2000). Most also maintain their own egg
marketing operations; they pack and deliver their own eggs.
The industry has consolidated. In 1987 there were around 2,500 operations. Today
there are approximately 260 egg producing companies each with 75,000 hens or more
representing about 95 percent of all the U.S.layers. Sixty-four companies have over one
million laying hens and eleven companies have five million plus layers.  The production of
eggs has grown, from 170.5 million cases in 1984 to 213.9 million in 2005.  The five
largest egg producing states represent approximately 50 percent of all U.S. layers with
Iowa being the top state representing more than eighty egg producers and 40 million layers
(USDA American Egg Board, 2006).
Egg producers own parent stock that lay the eggs. The eggs are then transported to a
company-owned hatchery to produce hatching eggs, chicks, and pullets.  Once the bird is
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hatched it is transported to another producer/farmer and, at the end of the production
period, the company removes the birds from that farm and takes them to a processing
facility that they also own.  Eggs destined for consumption are either packed or further
processed to be sold to large retail stores or chain restaurants for final consumption.
Hayenga et al. (2000) state, however, that medium-sized producers contract with others for
marketing services; they pack and deliver as directed by a marketing firln who may also be
an egg producing firm. This may for example apply to producers who are members of a
cooperation. The small producers sell to independent packing stations.
Consumer Demands and Animal Welfare
In Animal Welfare, Economics and Policy, Mclnemey (2004) argues food is no
longer considered from a necessity standpoint but has become a typical consumer good
since the focus has shifted from its quantitative availability to its qualitative attributes.
Consumers are not searching for the cheapest food; they are in search of food with the
highest quality and best value. The attributes that consumers are seeking in their food are
many and vary. They include nutritive value, environmental origin and locality of
production, taste and flavor, presentation and brand image, and method of production.
Welfare of livestock used to produce food is also growing in importance among some and
increasing pressure has been placed on livestock producers, especially egg and hog
producers, to satisfy the demanding standards of their large buyers.  Consumers who are
especially sensitive to welfare measures believe that the methods and conditions under
which food animals are kept by farmers carries through to become an attribute of the
resulting food product.
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h a nationwide survey conducted in June and July 2007 to measure consumer
preferences for farm animal welfare it was found that 95 percent of respondents believe
that the way animals are cared for is important (Lusk, Norwood, and Prickett, 2007).
However, only 52 percent thought 'the average American had the same concern.
Furthermore, whereas 76 percent of respondents said animal welfare was more important
than low meat prices, only 24 percent thought the average American felt the same.  The
authors concluded that people respond to survey questions in a manner that creates a
favorable impression of themselves, rather than their true preferences. Nevertheless these
statistics serve to show that there is a significant percentage of Americans that may be
concerned about animal welfare. Of particular note is that 75 percent of respondents said
they would vote for laws requiring more humane treatment of farm animals.
Animal rights have progressed rather slowly following the same pattern as
children's rights.  Both concerns generally address the issue of intentionally putting the
well-being of a living thing, be it hulnan or animal, which cannot react or complain over
the direct monetary and social needs of the "owner".  Life before the 1600s was very
difficult therefore the inhabitants of earth had to work tirelesslyjust so they were able to
have their basic needs such as food and shelter met.  Diseases claimed children's lives at a
very high rate.  Therefore, in order to secure labor for farms, parents would bear a lot of
children.  They took a very realistic view of the world.  Physical encouragement was a big
issue for both children and working animals.   If either failed to perfomi its duties, they
would be punished severely, sometimes even killed. In 1825, the House of Refuge in
America was founded which focused on helping children that were abused and abandoned.
After focusing on child abuse and helping the population meet their basic needs with more
12
ease, the industrial revolution then had time to focus on other issues and animal welfare
also became an issue (Shea, n.d.).
In the U.S. the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(ASPCA) was founded in 1866 by Henry Bergh, a wealthy philanthropist in New York, to
address the issue of the mistreatment of horses.  From that point the organization has grown
to dealing with almost every issue that involves helping animals and ensuring that they are
being treated in a humane mamer (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2006 and Shea, n.d.).
Over the years as the concern for the well being of animals has increased, there
have been more interest groups evolving including Compassion in World Farming (CIWF),
Animal Welfare Institute (AWI), Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), and People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals Q'ETA).  These groups are now targeting various
livestock industries and spurring more consumer demand for products from livestock
production following certain animal welfare guidelines.
Animal Welfare and the Livestock Industry
Robinson (2006) states that every year there is more public awareness of farm
animal welfare and the livestock industry' s common production practices; advocates have
been working non-stop to pass both state and federal statutes which dictate the care animals
must receive and the circumstances under which they must be raised for their welfare not to
be compromised.  Blandford (2006) mentions that there has been an increase in the number
of animal welfare bills introduced in the U.S. Congress in recent years and also much
activity at the state level, however only a few bills have been passed.  The target of most
activism is the confinement industry, not the rancher, feedlot sector or cow/calf producer.
Becker (2007), in summary, states that advocates of farm animal welfare are seeking
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alterations in animal agriculture practices that have been considered acceptable and
necessary for a long time.  Practices include but are not limited to, rearing large numbers of
hogs and chickens in intensive confinement systems; performing surgical procedures such
as castration and tail-docking for hogs, beak trimming; housing layer hens in cages; and
isolating veal calves in small crates.  This paper will emphasize the animal welfare issues
in the egg industry, especially confinement issues.
The Egg hdustry (2002), a monthly magirine that reports worldwide news for the
egg industry, published a forthright discussion on the welfare of hens.  The article included
opinions of members of such organizations as the HSUS, Compassion over Killing's,
United Poultry Concerns, and PETA.  The article states that `No issue poses greater
challenges to the egg industry than that of animal welfare."  It also mentions that, in the
U.S., more than 95 percent of the three million laying hens are confined in battery cages.
A battery cage is typically a small enclosure with a sloping floor and equipment for
feeding, drinking, and egg collection mounted on the front (European Commission,1996).
Cages have come under increasing criticism, however, largely because of the behavioral
restrictions that are imposed on the birds (Mench and Siegel, 2006).  Animal activists
contend that modem farm practices have reduced the welfare of farm animals (Matheny
and Leahy, 2007).  The space allowed for hens is so small that it prevents them from
performing many of their normal behaviors such as, stretching their wings, turning around
without touching other birds, perching, nesting, or dust bathing. Babcock (2002) states that
U.S. practices give each hen 53 square inches as compared to the EU regulations which
mandate that caged laying hens have at least 111 square inches of space by the year 2012.
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According to Sluizer (2006), many veterinary experts say modem confinement practices do
serious harm to farm animals' physical and mental health.
Altematively, Mclnemey (2004) states that, from a purely economic standpoint,
farm animals are viewed as one of the resources in livestock farming, which is in itself an
activity producing raw materials for the human food system in order to satisfy consumer
demands.
Because of the increasing public awareness for better treatment of farm animals and
the threat of losing sales from customers, players in the supply chain of the egg industry are
taking action and implementing standards aimed at addressing their support for better farm
animal welfare. One of the giant fast food chain restaurants, Burger King, has implemented
a set of animal welfare policies which include purchasing two percent of its eggs from
producers that do not confine laying hens in battery cages.  Burger King expects to more
than double this percentage by the end of 2007.  It has also implemented preference for
purchasing pork from producers that do not confine breeding pigs in gestation crates
(Martin, 2007).  Additionally, Rosenthal (2007) mentions that the nations' largest hog
producer, Smithfield Inc. has agreed to phase out the confinement of pigs in gestation
crates over the next decade.  The states of Arizona and Florida have also voted to ban
gestation crates in their states.  These efforts suggest that animal advocates are achieving
their objectives with small progress and may soon be seeing larger changes that may affect
the egg and pork industries in terns of prices of meat and other livestock.products in the
long run.
These issues being a concern to the industries have been the major motivation of
this study. Through modeling the likely interactions that will ensue due to increasing
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demands from animal rights groups, we provide a framework for food firms to consider
their strategic options. These insights coupled with economic theory may be the difference
between increasing revenue and struggling in the long run for sustenance for food firms.
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CHAPTER Ill. MHTHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter includes the definition of the strategic interactions analyzed, data used,
and assumptions made to estimate strategic behavior of industry stakeholders.  The
strategic interactions of players in the egg industry are modeled using a game theory
approach.  Game theory stems from neoclassic economic theory which is concerned with
two major areas.  One is the methods and conditions under which a person or entity seeks
to maximize its own utility.  Second is cost minimization by participants in markets where
their individual actions do not significantly influence others, that is, in a perfectly
competitive market structure.  However, there are many cases in which economic decisions
are strategic under circumstances where conflict is a factor, hence one party' s action
induces a reaction from others.  Game theory is the study of the ways in which strategic
interactions among rational players produce outcomes with respect to the utility obtained
from an object or event. The mathematical theory of strategic interactions was first noted
by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstem in 1944 (Stan ford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, 2006).
What one player in a specific industry chooses to do can influence how suppliers,
competitors, and consumers will react.  In the current study, game theory will be used to
model the strategic actions that may result given specific assumptions. Although game
theory is relevant to parlor games such as poker or bridge, most research in game theory
focuses on how groups of people interact (Levine, n.d.).  Gambit is the software employed;
it is a library of game theory software and tools for the construction and analysis of finite
extensive and strategic games (MCKelvey, MCLennan, and Turocy, 2000).  Ganbit
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analyzes the optimal choices of each player in a game and solves the equilibrium by
selecting the most optimal choice for each player based on the end-state payoffs assigned.
Payoffs were estimated using Microsoft Excel.
The three major elements that are common in game theory models include players,
strategies, and payoffs.  Major players for this study include animal welfare groups,large
food firms, and their competitors and suppliers.  These players decide among different
choice sets (strategies).
The general assumptions that apply to all games include: players are rational, each
player has two or more possible strategies, the game is either one of perfect information or
imperfect information, every possible combination of plays available to the players leads to
a well-defined end-state (win, lose, draw) that terminates the game, and a specified payoff
is associated with each end-state. Being rational means that a player can assess outcomes,
calculate paths to outcomes, and choose actions with the best payoffs given the actions of
other players (Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy). A game of complete information is
characterized by perfect knowledge over every possible outcome and its associated payoff
for each player.  An incomplete information game is one where players are not
knowledgeable as to what a certain outcome is worth to other players.  Other assumptions
are noted throughout as relevant to specific circumstances.
Although there have been numerous studies focusing on the economic impact of
animal welfare demands on various factors, there are a limited number that have utilized a
game theory model to study the strategic interactions among players.  In fact, "little
research has been conducted in to the causes and consequences of activist demands on food
companies" as reported Hudson and Lusk (2004, pg. 80),  Most studies have emphasized
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topics involving the relationship between food prices and animal welfare, animal welfare as
related to egg production systems, and the impact of increasing animal welfare standards
on global and local trade.
The only study that we are aware of that has examined the strategic interaction
between food companies and activists using a game theoretic model in a sequential
bargaining context is Hudson and Lusk (2004).  The study solves a sinple model where
competition is not explicitly recognized.  The highlight of the game was to find out when
food firms would offer some level of compliance based on the uncertainty level of
protestors (animal activists) being serious.  The study concluded that it is in the best
interest of food firms to comply with animal activists' demands.  Situations when
compliance is not the optimal strategy to pursue depended on the expected effect of protest,
the cost of protest to animal activists, and the cost for food firms to defend themselves.
In the current study, various "games" were considered to model important
interactions among food firms, animal activists, and suppliers.  Games were specifically
developed to demonstrate strategic reactions between food firms and farmers.  Four
frameworks were initially considered. ( 1) The first depicted the potential effect of a
"slippery slope effect" (e.g„ animal activists, encouraged by firms accommodating their
demands, will subsequently demand more).  Three additional frameworks were
characterized by contract agreements where a principal and an agent are involved.  (2) One
models the hold-up problem and considers the role of asset specificity (investment) under
unexpected or changing market demand.  (3) Another includes the potential for suppliers to
agree to, but breach, a contract. (4) The fourth explicitly includes reaction by firm
competitors.
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From these four possibilities, two models were analyzed2.  The contract model with
uncertainty was empirically analyzed and the more general model depicting interactions
between animal activists and two independent firms was theoretically examined.
Throughout the thesis, `firm' refers to food firms and "groups' refers to animal welfare
organizations.
Data
Data were obtained from website research and interviews with experts in various
fields, including animal activists, food firm persormel, and the poultry industry. Data were
collected from three major websites, www.mass.usda.gov, www.ams.usda.com and
www.usda. gov, and from various reports prepared by authors who utilized the same
websites for their analysis.3  Data collected included price, production cost, and premiums
for both conventional and organic eggs over the period 2004 to 2006.  All data are per
dozen eggs. Average prices were for the farm level, wholesale level, and retail level.
Production costs were for the farm level.  Data on price premiums for organic eggs were
limited.  Thus, the average percentage reported in Oberholtzer, Greene, and Lopez (2006)
was used.  It included only the years 2004 and 2005.
Farm prices for conventional eggs for the period of interest were collected from
USDA.  This data was reported monthly on a national level.  Wholesale prices for
conventional and organic eggs are reported by the USDA Poultry Market News and
Analysis branch monthly on a national level. Retail prices for conventional shell eggs were
not located, however weekly retail feature prices were availal)le from October 2005 until
the present.  No government source for cost of production data or farm prices for free-range
2 Details of the other two models are presented under the future work section in Chapter V.
3 Authors using the same website to cany out their analysis include Bell (2005) and Oberholtzer, Greene, and
Lopez (2006).
20
eggs was identified.  Costs of organically-produced eggs are higher not only due to higher
input costs for feed but also as most "free-ranging" birds tend to be brown laying varieties
which are larger, hardier birds that eat proportionately more  Ovlichael Sheats, Branch
Chief at the USDA Washington Branch, personal communication, November 16, 2007).
Since systematic collection of price data as well as production data for free-range
eggs in the U.S. is not available, estimating price premiums between conventional eggs and
free-range eggs is complicated.  For the purpose of this study, a proxy was used.  Because
free-range data is not statistically reported, organic egg data was used.4'5 Data that were not
systematically reported were obtained from reports from the Economic Research Service
and other goverrment agencies. The numbers used were those that are consistent with the
time period being used for this study.
With available data for premiums that organic or cage- free eggs can demand, the
payoffs for principal (firm) and agent (farmer) were estimated.  Although data was not used
for the game that was theoretically solved due to sensitive data requirements for payoff
estimates, variables were defined and assumptions made to make our conclusions realistic.
4 Although there was data on cage-free eggs, this was limited both in years and factors reported. For example
data is available for retail prices only from June 2005 to December 2006, while reported wholesale prices
were not found.
Cage-free (barn systems) is where laying hens are raised in large buildings (group housing). Use of the term
guarantees that the hens were not caged, but does not guarantee access to the outdoors. Free-range on the
other hand is a term used more for meat production and this is where livestock are raised with unrestrained
access to the outdoors (allowed to run loose).  Organic eggs come from hens fed special diets with access to
outdoors. All organic eggs may be termed free-range, however not all free-range can be termed organic.
Oberholtzer, Greene and Lopez (2006) define free-range to mean poultry have been allowed access to the
outside. The label is regulated by USDA for poultry but not for eggs.  No specific amount of time outside or
stock density is specified by the regulating agent (USDA).
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Scenario 1
Conceptual Model: Empirical Analysis: Principal-Agent Contract
Players: Principal (firm), Agent (farmer), and Nature (Uncertainty)
This game is a sequential game that falls under the category of principal-agent
contract. It is specifically an incentive contract where the principal is unable to monitor the
agent's action (moral hazard) and hence cannot tell whether the contract is being breached.
However agents still run the risk of being caught if they breach the contract since it is open
to verification and audit by either the principal or third parties.  It is modeled to reflect:
welfare standards that are not product testable such as free-range production requiring
allowing laying hens to access open spaces to be able to perform their normal behaviors.
The scenario is that groups have proposed to food firms that they buy eggs only
from producers that provide free-range produced eggs rather than from producers that
conflne their hens in battery cages.  The pattern of the game is that the firm offers a
contract to the farmer through a wholesaler to produce eggs from free-range hens rather
than those in already existing cages. If the agent accepts the contract, the agent decides if
the investment (free-range) will be made and whether to comply with the terms of the
contract or not.  Wholesalers act as middleman in the supply chain and hence are factored
in to estimate payoffs where applicable. The minimum cost incurred to prepare a
production contract for small contractors is assumed to be $2,000, a cost incurred only by
the firm.   Additionally, there would be a $1,000 cost for negotiating time, which would be
incurred by both parties. Of course this amount can vary based on time spent negotiating.
Some contracts will require more time while others will take less time before a decision is
reached (D., Saxowsky, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics, NDSU,
personal communication, November 8, 2007).  Both costs are fixed costs. The $2,000 is a
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fixed cost because, regardless of whether the agent complies or cheats, this cost would be
incuned.  Furthermore, this cost is incurred at one point in time since once the contract has
been drafted; the same contract details will be used for other farmers.  The firm need only
fill in the appropriate information for the specific farmer.  Negotiation cost is a fixed (and
sunk) cost also because the decision of whether to offer or not offer the contract comes
after time has been spent trying to reach an agreement that is, before "the game" begins.
We futher assume that preparation of the contract comes after there has been a strong
indication (during negotiation) that farmers are willing to invest in free-range production
(e.g., that they will accept the contract).
If the contract is breached, the cost that would be incurred for legal action is
assumed to be $10,000 per player.  This cost is a fixed cost for both players when the
farmer breaches the contract and is caught.  It is a fixed cost because, whether the case is
won or lost in court, the cost will be incurred.  It includes the cost for attorney fees.
Additionally we must note that there will be additional costs to both players if the contract
is breached including loss of goodwill, brand image, and loss of sales. Thus if the contract
is breached, and this is demonstrated in court or settlement, there are two additional costs
that the farmer may have incurred.  They may have to compensate the firm for:  1) the
premium paid for fraudulent eggs delivered and 2) punitive damages so as to compensate
for future firm losses. These additional costs are difficult to quantify because there are
many factors that must be taken into account.  For example, these costs will depend on the
point of the contract at which it is breached or discovered to be breached.  Additionally,
quantity covered by the contract is an important factor because a contract of 1,000 dozen
eggs will require less compensation than a contract for 50,000 dozen eggs.  A civil penalty
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of up to $ 10,000 per violation can be levied on any person who knowingly sells or labels as
organic a product that is not produced and handled in accordance with USDA regulations
(Oberholtzer, Greene, and Lopez, 2006). For the purpose of this analysis we assume a
25,000 dozen egg contract.  The game is characterized by a participation constraint node
and an incentive compatibility node as shown in Figure 3 .1.
Figure 3 .1. Principal-Agent Contract.
The incentive compatibility node is the node in the game tree that makes precise
what incentives must be provided to an agent to induce a predetermined effort (invest or
not invest) in free-range production and hence comply with the terms of the contract.  The
participation constraint node is the node that includes the option of accepting or rejecting
the contract. It includes the incentives necessary to induce an agent to accept the contract
and abandon current confinement practices for laying hens so as to meet the standards
imposed by the principal. In order for the egg producer to accept the contract, the net return
must be higher than the next best offer that the producer has (which we are assuming to be
to maintain current production practices).  The payoffs to the principal (firm) in the long
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run then depend on the whether the investment is made by the agent. Hence the net return
for investing in free-range production must exceed the expected value of not investing and
declaring that the investment has been undertaken (cheating the contract). This is because
an agent will not invest unless that investment is profitable. A chance node is included to
reflect the uncertainty involved where a farmer not making the investment could claim to
having made the investment and risk the probability of being caught and suffer the
consequences of breaching the contract.  The farmer also has the chance of not being
caught and hence yielding greater profits since costs will be less but the price charged will
be as if though the investment has been made.
Data to Derive Payoffs
Bell (2005) reports that, in general, it costs about $0.431 to produce a dozen
conventional eggs, while free-range production costs would increase by $0.284 for every
dozen of eggs (66 percent).  This cost estimate accounts for feed,labor, housing and
equipment depreciation and interest, cost of land, and miscellaneous expenses. Cage-free
production costs would increase due to additional medication required @ecause of higher
mortality rates with cage-free production), litter, and additional loss of eggs because of
group housing.
The average price of conventional eggs at the farm level for the period 2004 to
2006, according to ERS (2007) was $0.48.  Average price for organic eggs at the farm level
was $1.15. From 2004 through mid 2006, price premiums for organic shell eggs ranged
from 113 percent in 2004 to a high of 414 percent in 2005. The average price premium
over the entire period was 278 percent. This price premium however is for the wholesale
level.  In order to correctly obtain farmer payoffs we must determine the premium that
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farmers obtain for investing in free-range production. Since data pertaining to fain level
premiums for organic eggs was not readily available in any form, we must make an
assumption.  It is assumed that farmers receive half the premium received at the wholesale
level, or 139 percent.
Wholesale average price for conventional eggs was $0.65 from 2004 to 2006
(USDA). Average prices for conventional eggs ranged from $0.43 per dozen to a historical
high of $ 1.14 per dozen during the same period (Oberholtzer, Greene, and Lopez and
USDA, 2006).  Organic eggs sold for $2.34 a dozen (Oberholtzer, Greene, and Lopez).
This wholesale cost for conventional eggs includes $0.18 packaging cost (Sue Trudell,
Vice President, Express Market Analytics, personal communication, November 02, 2007).
This is the latest industry average cost of packaging. Table 3.1 is a summary of the data
used to derive payoffs.
Table 3.1. Ass.umptions Used to Derive Payoffs.
Data S/ dozen S/ 25,000dozen Source
Production cost for conventional
0.431
Dollars
Bell, 2005eggs 10,775
Price of conventional eggs at the
0.48 12,000 USDA (2007)fain level
Increase in production cost for 0.284
7,100 Bellfree-range
Production cost for free-range
0.715 17,875 Bell(0.431  + 0.284)
Premium: organic (farmers) 139%
Oberholtzer, Greene, and
Lopez (2006).
Premium of organic eggs
0.67 16,750 Calculated(Price * Premium rate)
Price at the farm level with
1.15 28,750 Calculated
premium (wholesaler pays)
(Price + Premium)
Wholesaler cost to package free-
0.18 4,500 Trudell (2007)range eggs
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Table 3.1  (continued)
Data S/ dozen S/ 25,000Dozen Source
lwholesaler total cost
1.33 33,250 Calculated(farm price of organic eggs +
packaging)
Wholesale price: conventional
0.65 16,250 USDA (2007)eggs with packaging cost
Wholesaler price: organic eggs
2.34 58,500
Oberholtzer, Greene, and
To retailer or food fiml Lopez and USDA
Retail price for conventional
1.04 26,000
Brettman (2007)
eggs
Retail price for organic eggs 2.85 71,250 USDA (2007)
Note: "Conventional eggs" refer to eggs from hens raised in cages.
Scenario 2
Conceptual Model: Theoretical Analysis
The game theory model shown in Figure 3.2 reflects the strategic interaction
between food firms (restaurants) given that animal activists (groups) are targeting them to
request that they meet certain animal welfare standards in procurement (e.g., require that
their suppliers follow particular current production practices). Unwillingness to comply
with activist' s demands may result in restaurants being protested through picketing and
other means which may cause economic damage in terns of loss of goodwill, brand image,
and even sales.
The specific assumptions made in this game are in addition to the general
assumptions that apply to a game theory model. Those include that all players are rational
and hence each player will assess the outcomes apd choose the ones with the best payoffs.
Furthermore, this is a perfect information game with no uncertainty involved.  Firms have
three pure strategies, whereas groups have two.  Although empirical analysis of this game
is beyond the scope of this thesis as it would require sensitive data to supbort payoff
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Figure 3.2. Two Firms Sequentially Facing Activists' Demands.
estimates, a theoretical approach is explored.  The specific game theory technique utilized
to analyze this framework is backward induction. According to Turocy and Stengel (2001 )
backward induction is used to solve games with perfect information.  It first considers the
moves that are the last in the game and determines the best action (greater payofty for a
player who moves under altemative choices for two preceding players.  Then, taking these
as given future actions, it proceeds backwards in time determining the best move for the
respective player until the initiating point of the tree is reached.
Perhaps the most important assumption governing the result of the initial analysis is
that consumers do not care about the animal welfare practice being proposed.  In order to
understand the nature of this sequential game with three players we also assume that the
food industry is comprised of two fims ®1ayers), Firm A and Fim 8. The primary reason
for a sequential move is due to the assumption that firms are targeted one at a time with
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Fiml A being first.  For example, PETA may first target MCDonalds and then another firm
such as Burger King. Although groups are the ones who make the demands, they are not
depicted as the first movers in the game, Firm A is initially reacting.  The game therefore
does not seek to predict the likelihood that activists will make a demand, but rather whether
they will protest the firm based on its response.  It is assumed that activists first approach
the fim, possibly through an informal negotiator.
The game has three sequential steps and initiates with Fimi A having the option to
choose among three strategies, which are, to comply with the new animal welfare standard
demanded (yes), to negotiate a compromise (com), or to refuse (no).  Complying here will
mean doing exactly what is being requested (e.g., only buy from those suppliers that adopt
complete free-range practices for their livestock production).  Firm 8, which is targeted
after Firm A, has the same strategies available.  Firm B's actions however may be
influenced by what its competitor, Firm A decides to do.  After both firms have been faced
with the new animal welfare standard demands, the third stage in the game is played by
activists that choose one of two strategies, either protest (P) the firms or decide to walk
away and leave their objectives unaccomplished (NP).
Further assumptions about the groups and their strategic options include
mentioning that groups will not protest when there is a "comply, comply" result from food
firms, and that the cost to protest either Firm A or Fim 8 is the same.  Further, protesting
both firms at the same time would cost twice as much than when only one firm is protested
at a time.
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Defining Variables
Food firms are facing activists who are pressuring them to require that their
suppliers change their production practices, mainly addressing the confinement issue in the
egg industry.  The change in revenue that a group can inflict on a restaurant is assumed to
be represented by E.  This variable is a function of price and quantity. If firms decide to
comply with the new standards there may be new (or revised) products that, depending on
the actions of competitor restaurants and elasticity of demand for animal welfare attributes,
may change demand.  There will also be changes in costs associated with compliance.  The
cost to comply is represented by K which includes cost to promote any new products and
increased input costs.  It is unlikely that any increased cost associated with raising animals
under reduced confinement can be fully absorbed by the farmer.  Thus, the resulting eggs
can be expected to cost more.
Animal activists' goals in general are not to directly cause economic damage.
Rather they are more interested in achieving increased animal welfare through eliminating
or altering confinement practices.  The increased welfare for activists is equal to W. If
groups are not satisfied with the choices from Firm A and Firm 8, they may protest either
firm or both.  Cost of protesting is denoted by P.  Table 3.2 summarizes the variables.
Table 3.2. Summary of variables.
Variable Function of
E =/®, q). p = price and q = quantity. The change in revenue for firms
depending on strategy choice, strategy choice of competitors, and of
activists, and response of consumers.
K =/®romotions, increased costs in inputs). Cost to firms to comply with
activists ' standards.
W =/(change in welfare).
P =/(nature and level of protest). Cost incurred by activists if they protest; p =
0 if they do not protest.
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CHAPTER IV. RESULTS
Scenario 1
This chapter shows the results obtained for both scenarios 1 and 2.  The results from
scenario 1, contracts between food fims and farmers, are shown in Figure 4.1.  The
numbers in parentheses after every node are payoffs. The first number corresponds to the
payoff for the `firm' and the second corresponds to the payoff for the "farmer."  All
numbers are in dollars.  The numbers in the parentheses below each node represent players
and information sets, respectively. For example, (2, 1) means player two (farmer),
infomation set one.  The numbers on the branches representing uncertainty are
probabilities. In the base case, there is a 70 percent chance of being caught and a 30 percent
chance of not being caught if investment is declared when it is not actually done.  These
probabilities are assumed and later tested with sensitivity analysis.  The payoffs for each
choice set are defined here, with the payoff to the firm being a change from the pre-game
profit realized.
Figure 4.1. Probabilities: 70 Percent Not Caught and 30 Perc'ent Caught.
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|42000,-565Z5)
(9750,16975)
1. (-1000, 225) Contract not offered.  The payoff for the firm is S-1,000 because it
experiences a negotiation cost of $1,000.  An agreement is not reached and activist group
pressure is ignored.  We assume that the firm will not offer the contract.  The farmer under
this case will continue producing conventional eggs, hence 1,225 is total revenue minus the
production cost of conventional eggs; (12,000 -10,775 = 1,225). The farmer will also
incur $ 1,000 for negotiation, therefore his final payoff is:  1,225 -1,000 = 225.
2. (S-3000, 225) Contract rejected.  Although the farmer will not accept the contract it still
continues producing the 25, 000 dozen conventional eggs for the open market.  Three
thousand dollars accounts for costs incurred including negotiation and preparing the
contract.  It is a negative payoff to the firm.  The farmer rejecting the contract will have
incurred negotiation cost as well which is $ 1,000. It will continue producing conventional
eggs for other buyers.
3. (9750, 9875) Contract accepted and the investment made. The firm's payoff with the
investment made and no breach from the agent will be the total revenue ( from retail price)
of free-range eggs minus wholesale price; from this total the fixed cost of $3,000 must also
be subtracted (71,250 -58,500 = 12,750, and 12,750 -3000 = 9,750).  The farmer's payoff
for investing in organic eggs is the price of organic eggs minus the production cost of
producing organic eggs (28,750 -17,875 -1,000 = 9,875).
4. (42000, -56525) Claiming to have invested, not invested, caught. Recall that firms
contract farmers through wholesalers.  The fimi's return is $42,000 because, although it
paid the price of free-range eggs to the wholesaler, we are assuming the farmer would have
to reimburse the premium charged by the wholesaler to the firm.  There is no penalty fee
applied here because when a contract is breached the settlement is usually to pay the
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difference between the value of what was promised and what was delivered.  Although this
is the case, settlement depends on the parties involved and what they agree to.  Although
the firm overpays the wholesaler $42,250 it did sell the misrepresented eggs at a free-range
price and does not necessarily later need to compensate customers.  Essentially, the firm
does not lose the money it claims in the settlement, thus, negotiation sometimes can be
reached where the amount paid to the firm is less than the actual premium that was paid a.
Saxowsky, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics, NDSU, personal
communication, November 8, 2007).  This total amount of $42,250 is later varied to test
the sensitivity of different settlement agreements.
Sales (25,000 dozen at 2.85/dozen)
Less Expenses
Legal fees
Fixed costs
Cost of eggs (25,000 dozen at 2.34)
Total Expenses
71,250
71,500
-250
Reimbursement
42.250
Net Income
42,000
The farmer has a negative payoff since, if caught, legal action may be taken by the
principal, reputation will be lost and the current contract may be terminated. The farmer
will also incur $10,000 for attorney fees and $1,000 for negotiation.  The egg industry is
highly vertically related (Hayenga et.al, 2000).  Because of vertical integration, wholesalers
have agreements with farmers to raise their laying hens and then pay farmers for the eggs
produced.  Farmers may be caught by firms (rates from the wholesaler) through auditing
parties that the firm will hire.  Therefore, when caught cheating, the contract firm is
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assumed to go after the farmer.  Wholesalers are assumed not to be knowledgeable of the
breach. Even if the firm goes after compensation from the wholesaler for the extra amount
of money paid for organic eggs that were actually conventional eggs, it is likely the
wholesaler will pressure the farmer to compensate the firm.  It was the farmer that breached
the agreement.  The wholesaler will also demand the farmer to reimburse the difference
that he/she paid to the farmer for the misrepresented eggs.  The farmer thus is exposed to
two costs: compensate the fim, and legal fees. Although the farmer must compensate the
wholesaler, this money is not a "cost" to the farmer because the farmer received that
premium and essentially is just returning the unearned money.  We test the sensitivity of
the results to this scenario where the farmer must compensate both the firm and the
wholesaler to situations where no wholesaler existed.  The payoff calculation associated
with reimbursing the wholesaler is shown below.
Wholesaler paid farmer free-range price for 25,000 dozens (1.15 * 25,000)
If wholesaler paid conventional price (0.48 * 25,000)
Reimburse
Farmer owes wholesaler cost for packaging (25,000 *0.18)
Total Cost
The farmer payoff therefore, includes the following:
Sales (25,000 *  1.15) premiuni included
Expenses:
Attorney fee
Negotiation fee
Reimbursing wholesaler (less premium)
Wholesaler packaging cost
Production cost (25,000 * 0.43)
Reimburse the fimi on behalf of the wholesaler
Total Expense:
Net Income
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10,000
1,000
16,750
4,500
10,775
42,250
28,750
12.000
16,750
4,500
21,250
28,750
85,275
-56,525
5. (9750,16975) Claiming to have invested, not caught. If the firm does not discover that
the investment has not been made then it will be paving the price of free-range eggs and
selling the eggs at free-range egg price (71,250 -58,500 -3,000 = 9,750); the farmer will
be earning profits at the fim's expense. Subtracting the $3,000 fixed cost from profits
yields $9,750.  The farmer will incur production cost for conventional eggs but charge the
price of free-range eggs to the wholesaler (28,750 -10,775 -1000 = 16,975).
One Sequential Hquilibrium
We assume a 30 percent probability that the farmer is caught breaching the contract.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the sequential equilibriuni to the game, which is, the contract will
be offered and the farmer will accept the contract and make the investment.  We note that
although the payoff to cheating is significantly more than the amount from investing
(16,975 versus 9,875), the farmer prefers to refrain from breach of contract.  This result is
due to the possibility of being caught and the relatively large negative payoff if caught.
These returns are however assuming absolute certainty; therefore expected payoffs
are calculated by factoring in the probabilities assigned to the chance node.  Let P represent
probability.  Thus the farmer's expected payoff with no investment made is:
P (caught I no investment) = 0.30 and P (not caught I no investment) = 0.70.
-56,525  * P (NI|C) +  16,975  * P QVI|NC) = -56,525  *0.3 +  16,975  *  0.70 = -5,075.
Hence because the expected payoff to the farmer is -$5,075 versus $9,875 when the
investment is made, the farmer will choose to comply with the terms of the contract.
On the other hand, the expected payoff to the firm when the farmer falls to invest is:
42,000 * P 0VI|C) + 9,750 * P 0VI|NC) = 42,000 * 0.30 + 9,750 * 0.70 = 19,425.
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Sensitivity 1 : Probabilities
The probabilities were changed to reflect a nine percent probability that the farmer
will be caught if he does not invest and declares that he does (implying a 91 percent
probability of not being caught) Q7igure 4.2).  The first observation here is that as the
probability of being caught decreases there is more incentive to breach the contract.
Similarly in this game the decision of whether to invest or not is dependent on the farmer's
expected payoffs.
P (caught I no investment) = 0.09 and P (not caught I no investment) = 0.91.
-56,525  * P 0VI|C) +  16,975  * P (NI|NC) = -56,525  *0.09 + 16,975  * 0.91  = 10,360.
Therefore, since the expected payoff of not investing is 10,360 versus 9,875 when the
investment is made, the farmer will choose not to invest.
Although trial and error using Gambit was utilized to select these probabilities,
there exist altemative ways to calculate these probabilities.  Following is an example:
Figure 4.2. Probabilities: 91 Percent Not Caught and 9 Percent Caught.
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(42000,-56525)
(9750,16975)
Farmer's payoff with the investment made is 9,875 as calculated earlier.
The farmer will be indifferent between making the investment and breaching the
contract if the expected payoff was the same when the contract is breached.  Similarly, the
farmer will not invest if the expected payoff for not investing was greater than that when
the investment is made, 9,875.  Therefore, calculating the probability at which the farmer
will be caught for the investment to be made is noted as the expected payoff with no
investment.
Expected payoff, no investment = -56,525 * P(C) + 16,975 * [1 -P(C)]
156,525 * P(C)+ 16,975 * [1 -P(C)]       =investment
payoff                                                      -56,525*P(C)+16,975* [1-P(C)]       =     9,875
P(C)=-56,525 + 16,975-16,975P          =     9,875
-73,500P        --7,100
P - 0.0965
At P(C) = 9.65 percent, the farmer is indifferent between investing and not investing.  As
long as the probability of being caught is 9.65 percent or less, the contract will be breached.
In the third game, we observe that, at 10 percent probability that the farmer will be
caught, the investment is made (Figure 4.3). Thus, we conclude that as long as the
probability of being caught is 9 percent or less the farmer will be inclined to invest and
breach the contract.  We also observe that the dominant strategy for the fimi is to offer the
contract, while the farmer will always accept. Thus the payoffs of the principal depend on
the action that the agent pursues and the action that the agent will pursue depends on the
expected payoff, which in turn depends on the probability of being caught.  The farmer's
expected payoff in this case is 9,625 as opposed to 9,875.  Therefore at this probability of
being caught the farmer will make the investment.
P (caught I no investment) = 0.10 and P (not caught I no investment) = 0.90.
-56,525  * P (NI|C) +  16,975  * P (NI|NC) = -56,525  *0.10 + 16,975  * 0.90 = 9,625.
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Figure 4.3. Probabilities: 90 Percent Not Caught and 10 Percent Caught.
(42000,-565Zj)
(9750,169?5)
Sensitivity 2: Premium
In order to account for premium effects in the equilibrium, we next assume different
values for the premium percentage that farmers can obtain for free-range eggs.  We
examined the output if famers were able to demand half of the 139 percent premium (69.5
percent). Recall that the base amount was obtained by dividing the total average premium
at the wholesale level by two.  To test for sensitivity to this premium, we first assumed a
quarter of the total wholesale level premium.
When the contract is not offered and when the contract is offered and rejected as
well as, when the contract is breached and not discovered, the payoffs stay the same as in
the base case for all other sensitivity tests regarding premium.  However, when the contract
is accepted and the investment made, although the payoff of the firm remains the same as
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in the base case, the farmer's payoff changes.  This is due to a different price for free-range
eggs.  The price of free-range eggs with a 69.5 percent premium is $0.81 as shown below
(3).
1, 2, and 4. Exactly match those from previous game.
3. (9750,1375) Contract accepted and the investment made.  The farmer's payoff is the
price of free-range eggs minus production cost of free-range eggs and negotiation cost.
[0.81  * 25,000 -(0.715  * 25,000)] -1000 = 1375.
5. (9750, 8475) Claiming to have invested; not caught.  If the breach is not discovered, the
payoff of the firm remains the same. The farmer will still incur production costs for
conventional eggs while charging the price of fi.ee-range eggs; however payoffs decrease
because the premium is less.
Farmer payoff = (price + premium) * quantity - conventional production cost - negotiation
cost                      =(0.48) + (0.33) * 25,000-10,775 -1000
- 8,475
From Figure 4.4 it is clear that even at a premium of 69.5 percent the dominant
strategy for firms remains to offer contract. Firms would offer the contract and famers
would accept the contract and invest. The strategy that would be undertaken by the farmer
is dependent on the probability of being caught breaching the contract and the expected
payoff to the farmer.  The famer invests with a 69.5 percent premium because its expected
payoff when no investment is made is -$ 11,025 as compared to positive $ 1,375 when the
investment is made.
P (caught I no investment) = 0.30 and P (not caught I no investment) = 0.70.
-56,525  * P 0VI|C) + 8,475  * P 0VI|NC) = -56,525  *0.30 + 8,475  * 0.70 = -11,025.
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(42000,i6525)
Figure 4.4. Farmer Premium 69.5 Percent.
Further sensitivity tests were done to identify the premium level that fariners would
have to be paid in order for firms to have an incentive to offer the contract and for farmers
to participate (accept contract).
In Figure 4.5, with a 58 percent premium firms will not offer the contract (the game
ends here).  This is the case because the firm prefers to lose S-1,000 for negotiation time
rather than S-3,000 for negotiating and preparing the contract when the farmer has given a
strong indication that it will not participate in the game.  At this premium the farmer is
better off producing conventional eggs because its payoff (based on a 25,000 dozen
contract) will be $225, while, if it accepts the contract and makes the investment, it will
only be able to Cam $85.
In Figure 4.6 at 59 percent premium, the result is quite different.  The firm is fully
convinced that it would be profitable to give in to the initial demands of animal activists.
The famer however, has some skepticism.  Although the firm will offer the contract, the
farmer will reject it.  This result is due to the estimated payoffs showing that rejecting the
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(-3000,Z25)
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(9750,7305)
investment, the expected payoff to the farmer is $325, while if the contract is breached the
expected payoff is negative, S-1 1,760.
P (caught I no investment) = 0.30 and P (not caught I no investment) = 0.70.
-56,525 * P qu|C) + 7,425 * P qu|NC) = -56,525 *0.30 + 7,425 * 0.70 = -11,760.
Based on this result we conclude that as long as the premiuni that cage-free eggs
can demand is 58 percent or lower, the contract will not be offered. Additionally, as long as
the premium is between 58 percent and 59 percent, firms will agree that it is compatible to
offer the contract; however, it is not with certainty farmers will accept the contract.  Only if
the premium is at least 60 percent is the farmers' decision to accept guaranteed.
Figure 4.7. Farmer Premium 60 Percent
(42000,-56525)
Sensitivity 3 : Reimbursing the Firm and Not the Wholesaler.
Sensitivity of the results to the amount that the farmer would have to pay when
caught cheating was tested.  In the base case, payoffs were calculated assuming the farmer
42
would have to reimburse the wholesaler for the premium charged.  Additionally, we also
included payment to the wholesaler for extra packaging and processing cost incuned.  The
farmer's payoff was a total of S-56,525 in a situation where the contract was breached and
it was discovered.  However, if the farmer reimbursed both the wholesaler and the firm, it
means that the only party that ends up losing when breach occurs is the farmer.  In the
following game we assume that the farmer would reimburse the premium charged by the
wholesaler to the firm and that the wholesaler would settle with this agreement.  This is
because the wholesaler would not lose in a breach since it would be the farmer reimbursing
the firm.  In the base case, the farmer reimburses the wholesaler $16,750 for the premium
charged.  The farmer also had to cover the wholesaler's expense of packaging, processing,
and grading, which was $4,500.  If the farmer did not have to retuni the wholesaler's
premium and cover packaging costs, its negative payoff would be decreased to S-35,275.
Figure 4.8 shows that although the farmer's loss decreases from $56,525 to $35,275
when the wholesaler is not reimbursed for the premium charged and the extra costs it
incuned packaging the misrepresented eggs, the sequential equilibrium remains the same.
The contract is offered, accepted, and the investment made.  In the base case the probability
of being discovered breaching the contract is 30 percent.  We expected the result to be
highly dependent on this probability.  Indeed, when the probability of being caught is 13
percent or less the farmer would more than likely breach the contract.  In the base case
where the famer would have a loss of $56,525, breach can occur when the probability of
being caught is 9 percent or less.  Restated, the decision of whether to breach or not
depends on the probability of being caught. Furthermore, as the amount lost when caught
breaching the contract decreases, there would have to be a higher probability of being
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caught to make the investment. That is, there is a tradeoff between probability of being
caught and penalty imposed if caught.
Figure 4.8. Wholesaler Not Reimbursed.
Sensitivity 4: Reimbursing the Firm 50 Percent of the Premium Charged.
In another case we assume that, since the firm may not explicitly lose money, it
will sell the eggs at free-range price and may not thereafter explicitly compensate
consumers for the premium charged.  In this case, the firm and the farmer may be able to
negotiate a settlement less than the amount of the premium charged.  In the base case
scenario the firm's operating retun was $42,000.  If both parties were to negotiate a 50
percent reimburs?ment of the premiuln charged, the firm would only receive $21,125 for
the premium charged on the faulty eggs.  Therefore instead of $42,000 the firm would have
a return of $20,875 (42,000 -21,125).
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The farmer in this case would only lose $ 14,150 if it were to breach the contract.
This is also excluding the wholesaler in the final settlement.  Thus, original loss -
(wholesaler reimbursement + cost covered for packaging + 50 percent firm reimbursement)
= 56,525 -(16,750 + 4,500 + 21,125) = 14,150.
Figure 4.9. 50 Percent Settlement.
("875,-14150)
(9750,16975)
Figure 4.9 shows that even when only 50 percent of the total premium charged to
the firm must be reimbursed, the one sequential equilibriuni remains the same.  The
contract is offered, accepted, and the investment made.  This result is also dependent on the
probability of being caught.  We again changed the probabilities given these payoffs and
found that, as long as the probability of being caught is 22 percent or less, farmers would
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more than likely breach the contract.  As the amount that can be lost if caught breaching the
contract decreases, investment is motivated only by a higher probability of being caught.
Scenario 2
Third Node Analysis
As in all games, players will choose the strategy that maximizes their payoff.
Animal activists attempt to maximize animal welfare.  Firms choose strategies that will
maximize payoffs. The optimal strategies to this game are obtained by backward induction
to derive the Nash equilibrium.  The third move in the game is made by groups who must
choose between accepting the decision from firms or proceed to protest the firms.  We must
note that groups will only accept a compromise if the payoff is greater than the payoff
associated with protesting.
Ultimately groups are striving to achieve a "comply, comply" action from both
firms, hence their goal is to convince firms the change in revenue is less than the cost of
compliance.  That is, to convince firms that the benefits of procuring eggs from free-range
production are greater than the costs; E -K > 0.  We assume that cunently firms believe
that E -K < 0.  If it was perceived as positive then rational firms would have already
implemented the animal welfare friendly procurement practices.
Second Node Analysis
In the second stage, firm a has three choices; comply with the standards, negotiate
a compromise, or refuse.  It is reasonable to assume the cost of complying, K, is greater
than the cost of compromising which is greater than the cost of refusing (Kbyy > Kbyc >
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Kbyn)6.  In order to achieve a "comply, comply" strategy, animal activists must therefore
convince the firms that the demand for the firm will change once free-range products are
introduced (or altematively that demand will negatively change if they are not
implemented).  To achieve full compliance, firms must be convinced that their change in
revenue will be greater if they complied fully than if they negotiated a compromise a3byy -
Kbyy > Ebyc - Kbyc > EbynpB -KbynpB)7.  For example, Firm a would negotiate a compromise
rather than fully comply if it cost less but did not affect revenue. The caveat is that a
compromise may not fully satisfy the activists but rather only reduce the likelihood or
extent of protest.  Thus although the firm negotiated a compromise, the chance of protest
remains.8
First Node Analysis
As mentioned earlier, animal activists are in the game with the goal of achieving
full compliance from both firms since this would mean that they would achieve their
maximum payoff (Wyy -0). Therefore, just as they have to convince Firm 8 that the
benefits of free-range production practices are greater than the costs that will be incurred,
in the same marmer they must be able to convince Firm A that the same holds. Therefore
Firm A must be convinced that a positive change in revenue if it complies will outweigh
any increased cost as compared to negotiating a compromise (Eayy - Kayy > Eayc - Kayc > Earn
-Kann).  To obtain their objective of "comply, comply," animal activists must convince both
6 The first subscript represents which firm to which the variable applies.  The second subscript represents
Firm A's choice of action while the third subscript represents the strategy undertaken by the Firm 8.  Y for
yes, c for compromise, and n for no.7 The fourth (and fifth) subscript denote the action taken by animal activists against firm A and 8,
respectively, p for protest and np for no protest.  The last subscript (capitalized) represents which finn is
either being protested or not.
8 This reflects a situation of only an informal compromise with one activist group (e.g., the agreement did not
have the requisite strength to negate a protest, or was not accepted by another activist group who did not
accept the compromise).
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firms that the price they can charge will increase or that they will sell more, or both (or
altematively that they would otherwise lose an amount greater than the cost of complying).
Assuming firms A and 8 compose the industry, activists would need to convince the firms
that industry demand for animal welfare is inelastic (e.g., industry revenue will increase if
more stringent animal welfare standards are adopted).
Nash Equilibrium Given Two Assumptions
It was previously noted that the preferred strategy for animal activists is "comply,
comply".  If competition on animal welfare standards does not influence firm-level demand
within the industry, i.e., customers are indifferent towards free-range products and products
coming from confined livestock or AE = 0, it becomes of greater concern for flrms to
minimize costs (refuse demands).  Obtaining this Nash equilibrium implies that even when
animal activists protest, the expected effects will be negligible. Thus, activists tend to focus
on convincing firms that their decision to not comply will negatively affect their revenues.
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This final chapter is composed of four sections.  Section one provides a brief
summary of the thesis.  Sections two and three are summaries of the main findings from the
scenarios analyzed, and conclusions and implications.  Section four outlines suggestions on
future work that may be explored.
Summary
The motivation for this study was a combination of factors.  There has been very
little study geared towards understanding the strategic actions that emerge anong food
firms, their competitors, and their suppliers in the egg industry in the face of increasing
pressure from animal activists.  Furthermore, from the limited work that exists, we found
only one study that utilizes a game theory model to analyze the strategic action between
food firms and animal welfare activists.
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the strategic decisions that food firms
would pursue given proposals from animal activists.  Optimal choices are defined for firms
and their suppliers in a situation where decisions regarding contracts for new production
standards are evaluated.  Also included is consideration of how progress on standards in
animal welfare might influence the procurement demands of food industry firms.  The
impact of choice sets on firm profitability was evaluated.  Optimal choices for industry
participants were selected and the sensitivity of key choices tested.
Two scenarios were explored; a principal-agent contract model between food firms
and farmers and a model including more than one firm targeted by animal activist
organizations.  The former model was empirically analyzed while the latter model was
theoretically examined.
49
Conclusions and Implications
Scenario 1 : Principal-Agent Contract
The principal-agent game was employed to determine the strategic actions that will
ensue between food firms and farmers when faced with proposed changes in animal
welfare standards in the production process.  Although systematic data for free-range
production was not available, using data for organically produced eggs aided in providing
reasonable results.  These results offer substantial base for conclusions to be drawn and to
make recommendations to food firms and farmers when considering the pressure exerted
by animal activists.  The framework itself provides a means for participants to consider
their situation (i.e., through use of their own estimated values).
We initiated this empirical analysis with a base case assuming specific costs for
negotiation and preparation of a 25,000 dozen egg contract, a 139 percent premium to
farmers for free-range egg production, and a 30 percent probability that a farmer would be
caught breaching the contract.
The one sequential equilibrium in the base case is that firms will always offer the
contract, farmers will always accept.  The issue of greatest interest is therefore whether
farmers will invest in free-range production or breach the contract.  From changing the
probabilities that farmers will be caught breaching the contract we are able to obtain results
that indicate the level at which auditing systems must be performed in order to entice
famers to honor the contract. Findings indicate that as long as the probability of being
caught is at least 10 percent farmers will make the investment. Otherwise, they will fall to
make the investment and declare that they did (i.e., accept but breach the contract).
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The next step was to test how sensitive these results were to the level of premium
that farmers receive for free-range eggs.  In estimating payoffs with varying premiums we
noted that when the contract is not offered, when it is rejected, and when the farmer is
caught breaching the contract, the returns remain the same as they were in the base case.
This analysis led us to conclude the following: as long as farmers are able to
demand at least a 60 percent premium, there is no doubt about accepting the contract, and
likewise about making the investment.  Furthermore, as the premium rate drops to 58
percent and below, firms will not consider complying with demands from animal activists.
Farmers would offer strong indication that they will not participate in such a contract
because it would be perceived as less profitable (assuming negotiation takes place before
preparation of contract).  With a slight increase in premium that is, at 59 percent premium,
although firms will offer the contract, farmers will not always accept.
In the base case, the farmer was assumed to be required to reimburse both the
wholesaler and the firm for the misrepresented eggs provided when caught breaching the
contract.  However, given that both the wholesaler and the firm sold the product at its
respected premium (e.g., as free-range eggs), in actuality they did not explicitly lose
money.  Therefore, we tested a scenario where the farmer was only responsible for the
flrm' s (but not the wholesalers') reimbursement. This considerably decreased the amount a
famer would lose if caught breaching the contract.  With the base case probability of being
caught breaching the contract (30 percent), the results indicate that the one sequential
equilibrium remains the same. The contract would be offered, accepted, and the investment
made.  We proceeded to test the sensitivity of the probabilities in these scenarios and found
out that as long as the probability of being caught breaching the contract was 13 percent or
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less, farmers would cheat.  When the farmer had to reimburse both the wholesaler and the
firm, breach is possible when the probability of being caught was 9 percent or less.
To verify that as loss decreases the probability of being caught must increase in
order for farmers to comply with the terms of the contract, we examined the scenario where
the farmer, in addition to not reimbursing the wholesaler, only had to reimburse the flrm
half of the premium charged for the misrepresented eggs.  This negotiated settlement is
possible because firms sold the eggs at free-range prices and face uncertain future losses
(e.g., as due to reputation effects). In this situation the farmer's loss decreases considerably.
Findings show that, in order to ensure against a breach of contract, there has to be at least
22 percent probability that the farmer will be discovered cheating.
From the scenarios explored and the sensitivity tests, we conclude that:  1. The
decision of whether to invest or not is highly dependent on the probability of being caught
cheating. 2. The strategy that will be undertaken at the participation node is dependent on
the premium that farmers can demand for free-range eggs.  3. As the amount that can be
lostifcaughtbreachingthecontractdecreases,investmentismotivatedonlywithahigher
probability of being caught.  This suggests that firms must be willing to spend more money
on auditing systems or flght for larger settlements when a farmer is caught breaching the
contract in order to ensure profit-motivated farmers comply with the terms of the
agreement.
Scenario 2
The sequential game presented was dedicated to explaining what would be the most
likely outcomes where groups are pressuring food firms to require that their suppliers
change their current production practices from intensive confinement to free-range. This
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theoretical analysis assumes that with a "comply, comply" strategy or a negotiated
compromise it is possible for animal activists to see an increase in animal welfare. The
model also shows that, if animal welfare is not a determinant of demand faced by food
fims, then firms will not comply or compromise.
In both cases the challenge for animal activists is to convince food firms that the
benefits of changing current production practices to free-range are greater than its costs. h
other words, their change in revenue if they fully comply will be positive and greater than
if they decided to negotiate a compromise or refuse.  If they want to see animal welfare
standards improved industry-wide they need to make the claim that the demand for the
entire industry will increase. In an attempt to reach their objectives, animal activist must
therefore have the capability to convince consumers that the conditions under which their
food was produced, specifically animal welfare considerations, are important factors.  That
is, produce an effect for firms when they make a strategic choice about procurement of the
welfare attribute.  It is recognized that people vary in their attitude to welfare, emphasizing
physical aspects, naturalness, or a combination of these (Appleby, 2005).  A major push for
organizations is to create awareness of and demand for a free-range attribute and to
emphasize to food firms that demand for this attribute is inelastic, especially among
specialty or niche markets.
Costs are also an important consideration.  Cost estimates associated with free-
range production vary.  HSUS (2006) reports a range from 26 to 59 percent, while Bell
(2005) reports 66 percent.  Because farmers cannot likely absorb the additional cost to a
great extent, and therefore it will need to be passed to consumers or will lessen firm profits,
there is incentive to reduce this cost.  Animal activists should work to convince firms that
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costs associated with less confined production will more than compensate for increased
input costs through increased income. Egg consumption has low price elasticity. The own
price elasticity of demand for shell eggs in the United States is -0.057.  Economically this
implies that food firms are able to pass on additional costs to consumers without
considerably affecting their market share.  However, elasticity of demand faced by industry
firms is much higher and therefore industry-wide initiatives are likely to be more
successful.
Animal activists, in the long run, may be able to achieve the "comply, comply"
strategy they are seeking through providing the right data and evidence that less
confinement is economically profitable and sustainable for food firms to adopt.  Consumer
behavior is not the main driving force behind on-fain efficiency since there is data that
demonstrates that little of consumers' money actually reaches famers.  It is estimated that
of each dollar consumers spend on food only 19 cents goes to the farmer, the rest is
absorbed by others in the production line including those who package, transport, and
market the products.  Additionally, when consumers purchase meals at restaurants the cost
of animal products in the meal only account for approximately 5 percent of its purchase
price.  Therefore an increase in production costs only add about 0.5 percent to the price of
an average restaurant meal (Appleby, 2005).
Food fims must be able to clearly see the outcome of their actions to avoid
negatively affecting their market share, sales, and of course brand image.  This is because
assuming that all food firms adopt free-range production (e.g„ fi.ee-range eggs dominated),
supply of egos would decrease as they are more expensive to produce.  This would imply
an increase in the price of egg-products as well as a decrease in the quantity and consumer
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surplus.  This would have a greater positive impact at the farm level since producer surplus
would be increased (Babcock, Miranowski, and Carbone, 2002).  At the fim level we also
note that, if one fim complies and the other does not, the change in revenue for the
complying firm is expected to be positive; E > 0.  This result is attributed to an increase in
price and/or quantity, depending on the degree to which competition matters (elasticity of
demand for the firm) and on elasticity of demand for the industry.  Food firms must be
cautious, however, in that the market for welfare-ffiendly products may be a niche and the
premium may decline rapidly once the consumer base for which this is an important
attribute is satisfied.
When it comes to animal welfare and its associated impacts on the food product
market there are limited studies that have been conducted in this area.  Existing literature in
general focuses on only partial analysis of animal agriculture and not the entire U.S.
industry that deals with animal welfare issues.  Attempts to empirically analyze the
relationship of food firms and animal activists using a game theory model appear to be
limited to Hudson and Lusk (2004).  This thesis sets up a theoretical framework to consider
fim strategy in a situation where competitor strategies and consumer demand are not
influenced by firm choice and introduces these influences.  It allows for consideration of
actions that animal activists will pursue to convince food firms that fi.ee-range production
is a promising aspect to consider investing in.
Future Work
Scenarios for Consideration
This study focused on two specific games; an empirical analysis for a contract type
game and a theoretical analysis for a situation where competition among food firms is
explicitly included.  Two additional frameworks are offered that reflect other potential
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interactions that can be modeled to evaluate the issue with new animal welfare standard
options facing large food firms. These scenarios can be the basis for additional work in
lightofcurrentindustryconditions.Thenumbersinparenthesesrepresenttheplayerand
the infomation set. For example, (1, 2) means player one, information set two.
Slippery Slope
The first framework is structured to model a `slippery slope'9 result when groups
and firms "play" in a sequential game that will continue indefinitely. There exists
incomplete information such that the firm is unable to verify the level of seriousness that
the group has in threats to protest against the firm.  The firm may be inclined to comply or
not based on the level of seriousness that it anticipates from animal activists. Assume
standard `A' has been set by the group which, for example, could be for firms to request
that their egg producers invest in free-range production.  The groups are targeting food
fimswhobuyeggsfromproducerswhointheirviewdonotoffersufficientlylargepens
forproperanimalmovement(alongwithissuesregardinghandlingpractices)(Hudsonand
Lusk, 2004). The firm has three choices which are to agree and request that famers (their
suppliers) invest in fi.ee-range production for laying hens (Adopt A), to say no, or to
compromise with animal activists and perhaps require investment in only a
portion/percentageofwhatisbeenrequested(Adopts)(Figure5.1).
(generallyunwanted)eventlater(Thompson,2005).Inthiscaseitwouldbearguedthatgivingintoanimal
activist demands at one point would increase the likelihood of future demands.
The Slippery Slope argument states that one action win initiate a chain of events that will lead to a
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Figure 5.1. Slippery Slope.  Game continues indefinitely.
Based on the decision that the firm makes, groups will either stop with this request
or move on to propose another standard.  The important question to answer is, up to what
point will animal welfare groups continue pushing further on this agenda if fims decide to
comply with an initial standard and hence impose them on their suppliers?
Based on the equilibrium obtained from this game, recommendations can be made
as to whether it is a profitable short and long-run decision for firms to go ahead and be
fully supportive of the standards and evaluate how their actions will affect their payoffs.  It
is assumed that the group has the capability to make a public protest against the firm if the
firm does not agree to change its producer standards (and hence change the fim's payoff).
Payoffs are not included within this game tree. However, if this scenario was to be
empirically evaluated, payoffs for the two players will be a function of different variables.
For the animal activist it would be a function of increased animal welfare, the cost of
setting the standard and the cost of protesting against the food firm if they decide on that
action if the firm does not comply or if they do not accept the compromise.  On the other
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hand, payoffs to the firm will be a function of the expected future changes in revenue due
to changes in prices and sales, and cost.
Principal Agent-Hold Up Problem
Another game models the hold-up situation. This framework is another principal
agent problem where the principals are large food firms including chain restaurants and the
agents are egg producers.  This scenario can be modeled under the assumption that firms
accept the increasing pressure of groups and decide to impose new standards on their egg
suppliers. Food firms will either choose to contract or not contract a specific egg producer
(Figure 5.2). The second stage of the game reflects the decision of the contracted egg
producer as whether to invest in free-range production or not.  We th`en move to account
for market uncertainty that may result for the demand of `free-range' eggs as opposed to
conventional eggs from hens raised in a confined production system.  After accepting the
contract, the egg producer will decide whether to invest in free-range for its laying hens or
if the contract will be breached and no investment will be made although the egg producer
will still claim to having followed the specific standards set by the food flrm.
The next stage of the game is where the focus of the game.  Here we analyze how
each party in the game will react depending on the market conditions that arise for eggs
that are from chickens raised with access to outdoors.  Food firms will want to `hold-up
egg producers' if the demand is low (indicated by a specific probability, p) since they will
want to renegotiate the price of the initial contract. On the other hand if the demand for
free-range eggs is high (indicated by the remaining probability,  1-p) then it will be the egg
producers that will want to demand a higher price for their product from food firms.
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